Case # NLJ 97-27 Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

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GROUP 1
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SECKET

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CITE

DIST 6 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM

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SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S VIEWS ON PROBABLE NORTH

1 Second

3.4(b)(1)


VIETNAMESE DEMANDS DURING FORTHCOMING

PEACE TALKS

ACQ

VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE



3,4 (b) (1)

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU

3.4.(6)(1)

EXPECTS HANOI TO MAKE TWO DEMANDS DURING THE FORTHCOMING PEACE

TALKS THAT WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM: (1) THAT THE GOVERN-

MENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL-

LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AND (2) THAT THE GVN FORM A GENUINE

COALITION WITH THE NFLSV. THIEU CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT

S-E-C-D

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SE-CR-E-T (classification)

(dissem controls)

THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS/NOT LEAD TO A DIMINUTION OF U.S.

AID AND THAT THE GVN EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT FROM SEPARATING THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT

FROM THAT OF A TREATY TO END THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIEU

SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILI
ZATION.

BRIEFED THIEU ON A NEW INTERMINIS
TERIAL COUNCIL CHARGED WITH STUDYING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GVN

AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE VIET

CONG TET OFFENSIVE. END SUMMARY.

NGUYEN VAN THIEU

3,4(6)(1)

PRESIDENT

EXPECTS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (DRY) TO

MAKE TWO DEMANDS OF THE AMERICANS DURING FORTHCOMING PEACE

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THIEU WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT. FIRST,

THIEU EXPECTS HANOI TO REJECT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE


SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (GVN) AND TO INSIST THAT THE GVN

NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH

VIETNAM (NFLSV). THIEU SAID THAT WHILE THE GVN IS WILLING TO

MEET ANYWHERE WITH DRV REPRESENTATIVES, IT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE

STOR-E-T



S-E-C -E-T

(dissem controls)

EDITIONS

WITH THE NFLSV. ALSO, THIEU THINKS HANOI WILL INSIST ON A GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN), INCLUDING THE NFLSV. THIEU SAID THAT NO SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PRESENT MILITARY OR GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

THIEU MENTIONED A NUMBER OF OTHER PRIORITIES TO WHICH HE WAS ADDRESSING HIS ATTENTION. HE SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS/ NOT LEAD TO ANY DIMINUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC. ASSISTANCE, SINCE THIS AID WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT VIETNAMESE GOVERN-MENT. HE SAID THAT THE GVN SHOULD ALSO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG) FROM SEPARATING THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM THAT OF A JUST EVEN WITHOUT A BOMBING PEACE TREATY ENDING THE WAR IN SVN. HALT, TALKS COULD LAST A LONG TIME. WITH A BOMBING HALT, THEY WOULD PROBABLY LAST EVEN LONGER. DURING THIS PERIOD THE DRV NOT ONLY WILL STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY FORCES BUT IT WILL INFILTRATE MANY POLITICAL CADRES INTO THE SOUTH. NEGOTIATIONS ABORT, THE GVN WILL BE FACED WITH A MUCH MORE..... DIFFICULT SITUATION SINCE THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL CADRES WILL

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S-E- E-T

(dissem controls)

BE WORKING HARD TO WEAKEN POPULAR RESISTANCE. THUS, A BOMBING HALT SHOULD BE CLOSELY RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH.

- J. THIEU SAID HE HAS BEEN GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION
 TO DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILIZATION AS AN INDICATION OF GVN
 DETERMINATION. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID HE WAS SINCERE WHEN
 HE DECLARED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES
 TO REMOVE SOME OF THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1968. HE THOUGHT
 AT LEAST "SEVERAL BATTALIONS" SHOULD BE PHASED OUT BY THAT
 TIME AS A TOKEN INDICATION OF GVN DETERMINATION TO PLAY A
 LARGER ROLE IN ITS OWN DEFENSE.
- TERIAL COUNCIL!


CONSISTS OF THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, CHIEU HOI COPEN ARMS) VETERANS, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY, AMONG OTHERS. THE COMMITTEE IS CHARGED WITH STUDY-ING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE ENEMY'S TET TRUCE ATTACKS.

IT IS ALSO STUDYING WAYS TO COORDINATE THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL-WARFARE PROGRAM NOW SCATTERED AMONG SEVERAL MINISTRIES

AND THE ARMED FORCES.

THE COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY AGREED

S-E-C





ON THREE POINTS:

- A. THE GVN MUST AKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS PRESENT IN
 CREASED MORAL POSITION IN THE FORUM OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

 SINCE THE GVN CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE USG IN THE BOMBING

 HALT AND IN THE INITIATIVES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, IT BENE
 FITS FROM THE IMPROVED MORAL POSITION OF THE USG RESULTING

 FROM THESE MEASURES.
- B. THE GVN MUST DEVISE WAYS TO KEEP UP THE "FIGHTING SPIRIT" OF THE PEOPLE DURING PEACE TALKS. IF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE CONCENTRATE ONLY ON THE HOPE OF PEACE AND FORGET THE REASONS WHY THE GVN IS FIGHTING THE WAR AND IF NEGOTIATIONS DO NOT LEAD TO PEACE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RECAPTURE THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE.
- C. ALL STEPS POSSIBLE MUST BE TAKEN TO CONVINCE THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH THAT THEY MUST COMPEL THEIR GOVERNMENT TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. THIS WILL INVOLVE PRIMARILY THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM AND OTHER MEANS TO AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION THERE.
- 5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

